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to its indicated destination, public employees could divulge heinous
wrongdoing and then "thumb their noses" at the public who had
hired them while asserting freedom from dismissal due to granted
immunity.60 The Addonizio court concluded by saying that in all
rectitude the doctrine of immunity could not be carried to this ex-
treme and ,that it would be proper to hold public employees account-
able for answering questions related to their employment. 61 This does
not mean that the public employee has been deprived of any constitu-
tional rights by virtue of his chosen employment. It does mean, how-
ever, that society has a right -to demand an accounting from its em-
ployees. Due to the high degree of trust placed in these individuals,
they cannot either refuse an accounting or give an unsatisfactory ac-
counting and claim continued right to employment based on an im-
munity statute under which they had testified. This would be too
great a burden to require society to bear. It seems unfortunate that the
Florida court did not confront this inevitable constitutional issue
instead of using the "dictionary approach" and trying merely to define
what is and what is not a "penalty or forfeiture." They appear to have
reached the right result in Baron but they could have confronted the




The right to trial by jury in civil cases is guaranteed by the seventh
amendment -to the United States Constitution.1 It has long been held,
however, by both state2 and federals courts, that this quarantee refers
°'Id. at 547 n.3.
3'Id. at 545-47.
'The seventh amendment provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONsr. amend. VII.
2E.g., Jehl v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 427 P.2d 988, 59 Cal. Rptr.
276 (1967); Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 57 S.W.2d 969 (1933); Middleton v.
Whitridge, 213 N.Y. 499, io8 N.E. 192 (1915); Wooten v. Dallas Hunting & Fish-
ing Club, 427 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
3E.g., Southern Ry. v. City of Durham, 266 U.S. 178 (1924); Minneapolis &
St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); lacaponi v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.,
258 F. Supp. 88o (W.D. Pa. 1966), aff'd., 379 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1054 (1968); see Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (igoo).
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only to suits in the federal courts, and that it is not binding on the
several states, 4 who may prescribe particular procedures to be followed
in their own courts. 5
One such procedure which has been widely instituted by the states
provides for non-unanimous jury verdicts in civil trials.6 Although
this procedure varies in form, its primary purposes have been to avoid
unjust verdicts resulting from dishonest and recalicitrant jurors, to
prevent ,the economic loss of mistrials, to relieve court congestion, and
to avoid unfair delay in the administration of justice.7 However, such
provisions have recurrently raised the question of how the individual
jurors must distribute their votes on all the issues raised by the evi-
dence in order to constitute a valid verdict. For example, in a state
allowing five-sixths of the jury to return a valid verdict, the question
is whether any ten jurors may decide any issue presented by the
evidence, or whether the same ten must agree on every issue presented.
In the case of Ward v. Weekes s the Superior Court of New Jersey
'Cases cited notes 2 & 3 supra.
'Morin v. Becker, 6 N.J. 457, 79 A.2d 29 (1951). See State ex rel Simmons
v. American Surety Co., 210 S.W. 428 (Mo. 1919). These cases have sustained
the validity of the state procedural provisions for non-unanimous jury verdicts.
It has been repeatedly held, however, that their validity can derive only from
an enabling provision in the state constitution. See Ewing v. Duncan, 209 Ind.
686, 197 N.E. 9o (1935); New York Cent. R.R. v. Hazelbaker, lO1 Ind. App.
414, 199 N.E. 425 (1936). See also Gabbert v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 171 Mo.
84, 70 S.W. 891 (1902).
Eight jurisdictions permit a verdict by five-sixths of the jury. ALASKA CODE
CIv. PRO. § 09.20.100 (1962); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 635-20 (1968); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 29340 (1969) (if court below circuit court); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 512.1 (Supp. 1970);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:8o-2 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-I-1(48)(b) (1954); N.Y.
CIV. PRAc. LAw § 4113 (McKinney 1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 270.-25() (1957).
Twelve jurisdictions permit a verdict by three-fourths of the jury. ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 21-102(B) (1956); CALIF. CIV. PRO. §§ 613, 618 (West 1955); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-222 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 10-217 (1948); LA. CODE
CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 1795 (West 1961); MIss. CODE ANN. § 1801 (Recomp. 1957);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 494.210 (Vernon 1952) (2/3 in courts not of record); OHIO
R Ev. CODE ANN. §§ 2315.09, 2315.11 (Baldwin 1964); ORE. REv. STAT. § 17.355
(Repl. Vol. 1969); S.D. CODE ANN. §§ 15-14-27, 15-14-29 (1967); UTAH R. CIV. PRO.
47(q) (1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 4-44.380 (1959). One state permits a verdict by
two-thirds of the jury. MONT. REv. CODE § 93-5105 (RepI. Vol. 1964). Two states
allow five-sixths of the jury to return a verdict after specified periods of delibera-
tion. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 546.17 (Supp. 197o) (after six hours of deliberation). Five
jurisdictions permit a verdict by a majority of the jury if both parties consent.
IOWA R. CIv. PRO. Ro3(a) (1951); MD. R. CIV. PRO. 544 (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ iA-i, R. 48 (Repl. Vol. 1969); W.VA. R. Civ. PRO. 48 (1966); Wyo. R. CIv. PRO.
48 (1957).
7Ward v. Weekes, 107 N.J. Super. 351, 258 A.2d 379, 381 (App. Div. 1969);
Ntate v. M., 96 N.J. Super. 335, 233 A.2d 65, 69 (App. Div. 1967).
*107 N.J. Super. 351, 258 A.2d 379 (App. Div. 1969).
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held that the constitutional and statutory10 provisions for a valid ver-
dict by five-sixths of the jury in a civil trial permitted any ten jurors to
agree on any issue raised. Plaintiff Ward was injured in an automobile
accident involving a taxi owned by defendant Weekes and driven by
defendant Bell. A verdict was returned against both defendants and
judgment was rendered thereon. A poll of the jury revealed that two
jurors agreed with the finding of liability but disagreed on the amount
of damages, and two different jurors agreed with the damages but
disagreed with the finding of liability. The result was a ten-two (five-
sixths) verdict for Ward, but only eight of the jurors (two-thirds)
agreed with the verdict as a whole. Ward was granted a new trial on
the ground that the verdict was fatally defective as it was rendered
by less than five-sixths of the jury.
The issue presented by the appeal was whether a verdict is valid
where the same ten jurors fail to agree on all the issues embodied in
it. The superior court reversed the decision setting aside the verdict.
The court reasoned that had the legislature intended the same five-
sixths to agree on all issues it would have so provided." There was no
evidence that any of the dissenting jurors had acted in violation of his
oath to render a true verdict according to the evidence. Furthermore,
to require the same five-sixths to agree on every issue would be in
derogation of the policies upon which the provision was based.
12
The Ward decision stands contrary to the rule (hereinafter referred
to as the Wisconsin rule)' 3 established by an almost uninterrupted line
of cases14 holding that the same fractional group of jurors must concur
9"The legislature may provide that in any civil cause a verdict may be
rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury." N.J. CoNsT. art. x, par. 9.
w'In any civil cause wherein a jury of 12 shall be impanelled, a verdict may
be rendered by so or more of the jury agreeing, and, if 6 be impanelled, then
by 5 or more of the jury agreeing." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:8o-2 (1952).
"The court's argument was based partially on the fact that the state of
Wisconsin did specifically add the rule to its statute.
A verdict agreed to by five-sixths of the jurors shall be the verdict of the
jury. If more than one question must be answered to arrive at a verdict
on the same cause of action, the same five-sixths of the jurors must agree
on all such questions.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 270.25(1) (1957). Wisconsin has been the most influential
jurisdiction in the development of the rule, and its decisions have uniformly
followed that rule, both before and since its codification in 1951. See Wisconsin
cases cited note 14 infra. For this reason it seems appropriate to refer to the rule
as the "Wisconsin rule."
'See text accompanying note 7 supra.
23Note ii supra.
"'Schoenbach v. Key Sys. Transit Lines, 168 Cal. 2d 298, 335 P.2d 725 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1959); Nelson v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 2d 119, 78 P.2d 1037
(Dist. Ct. App. 1938); Balero v. Littell, 124 Cal. App. 19o, 12 P.2d 41 (Dist. Ct.
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on each issue to be resolved. There have been several theories sug-
gested as a basis for this rule. One of the earliest of these drew an
analogy to the unanimity required in jury verdicts at common law.15
It was necessary not only that the jury unanimously agree upon the
general result articulated in the verdict, but also that there be unani-
mous agreement on the essential facts upon which the general result
was based.10 It has therefore been argued that to allow different frac-
tional sets of jurors to agree upon the various issues embodied in the
verdict "would make a much more substantial encroachment upon
the common-law jury of 12 than can be held to be effected. ."17 by
the statutes providing for non-unanimous verdicts.
Another basis which has been used to justify the Wisconsin rule
is the interpretation of the verdict as a non-fragmentable totality.'s
"A verdict is the expression of the concurrence of individual judg-
ments, rather than the product of mixed thoughts."'19 The verdict is a
whole and separate entity and represents one ultimate finding on the
App. 1932); Earl v. Times-Mirror Co., 185 Cal. 165, 196 P. 57 (1921); Baxter
v. Tankersley, 416 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1967); Plaster v. Akron Union Pass. Depot
Co., iol Ohio App. 27, 137 N.E.2d 624 (1955): Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Ore. 521,
414 P.2d 797 (1966); Munger v. State Indus. Acc. Comm'n, 243 Ore. 419, 414 P.2d
328 (1966); Shultz v. Monterey, 232 Ore. 421, 375 P.2d 829 (1962); Clark v.
Strain, 212 Ore. 357, 319 P.2d 940 (1958); Freeman v. Wentworth & Irwin, Inc.,
139 Ore. 1, 7 P.2d 796 (1932); Devoni v. Department of Labor and Indus., 36
Wash. 2d 27, 217 P.2d 332 (1950); Strupp v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 14
Wis. 2d i58, lO9 N.V.2d 66o (1961); Hupf v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 12 Wis. 2d
176, 107 N.V.2d 185 (i96i); Fleishhacker v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Wis.
215, 79 N.W.2d 817 (1956); McCauley v. International Trading Co., 268 Wis. 62,
66 N.W.2d 633 (1954); Augustin v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Transp. Co., 259 Wis.
625, 49 N.W.2d 730 (1951); Scipior v. Shea, 252 Wis. 185, 31 N.W.2d 199 (1948);
Haase v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 250 Wis. 422, 27 N.W.2d 468 (1947);
Stylow v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Transp. Co., 241 Wis. 211, 5 N.W.2d 750 (1942);
Fraundorf v. Schmidt, 216 Wis. 158, 256 N.W. 699 (1934); Guth v. Fisher, 213
Wis. 323, 251 N.V. 223 (1933); Biersach v. Wechselberg, 206 Wis. 113, 238 N.W.
9o5 (1931); Lefebvre v. Nickolai, 205 Wis. 115, 236 N.W. 684 (1931); Larson v.
Koller, 198 Wis. 16o, 223 N.W. 426 (1929); Christensen v. Petersen, 198 Wis. 222,
222 N.W. 231 (1928); Will v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 191 Wis. 247, 21o N.W.
717 (1926); Hobbs v. Nelson, 188 Wis. 1O8, 205 N.W. 918 (1925); Bentson v. Brown,
x86 Wis. 629, 203 N.W. 380 (1925); Kosak v. Boyce, 185 Wis. 513, 201 N.W. 757
(1925); Dick v. Heisler, 184 Wis. 77, 198 N.W. 734 (1924). See Stokdyk v. Schmidt,
19o Wis. io8, 20o8 N.V. 941 (1926); Stevens v. Montfort State Bank, 184 Wis. 621,
198 N.W. 6oo (1924); cf. Carlin v. Prickett, 81 Cal. App. 2d 688, 184 P.2d 945
(Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
"Will v Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 191 Wis. 247, 21o N.W. 717 (1926).
"Barker v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 89 Kan. 573, 132 P. 156 (1913).
"Hobbs v. Nelson, 188 Wis. io8, 2o5 N.W. 918, 921 (1925).
"15Earl v. Times-Mirror Co., 185 Cal. 165, 196 P. 57 (1921); Clark v. Strain,
212 Ore. 357, 319 P.2d 94o (1958).
"State v. Bybee, 17 Kan. 462, 467 (1877).
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basis of -the several issues. This view is historically represented by the
rule that inconsistent findings in special verdicts are ineffective 20 and
perceives the verdict as representing in total all the individual issues
presented by the evidence. The "totality" view of the verdict was mani-
fested in Earl v. Times-Mirror Co.,2 1 where the plaintiff sought both
compensatory and punitive damages. The court asked the jury for a
special finding as to each but pointed out that the verdict was not
thereby fragmented. The two issues were segregated merely to facili-
tate determination of the basis upon which the jury acted, and in
fact the verdict represented an indivisible whole.
22
The totality theory has been impliedly recognized in the consist-
ent application of the Wisconsin rule to cases involving special ver-
dicts.23 These cases have repeatedly held that ,the same fractional group
of jurors must agree on the answer to each question essential to the
verdict.
The only qualification which has been placed on the Wisconsin
rule is that the same fractional set of jurors need agree only on those
issues essential to the verdict, rather than on every issue presented
by the evidence. In other words, "questions not essential to judgment
because immaterial 24 or because rendered immaterial by the answers
found to other questions25 by all or ten agreed jurors may be disagreed
to by three or more jurors. '2 Therefore, for example, in a verdict
representing findings on negligence, contributory negligence, and
amount of damages, the concurrence of the necessary fraction of
nOSee Drewry's Ltd., U.S.A. v. Crippen, 113 Ind. App. 12o, 44 N.E.2d 1oo6
(App. Ct. 1942); Larrissey v. Norwalk Truck Lines, Inc., 155 Ohio St. 207, 98
N.E.2d 419 (1951); Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64, 183 S.W.2d 453 (1944).
2 185 Cal. 165, 196 P. 57 (1921).
22In a lucid dissent, Judge Olney pointed out the inconsistency of the majority
opinion which went on to split up the verdict for the purposes of remand. Id.
at 71.
23See Nelson v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 2d 119, 78 P.2d 1037 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1938); Munger v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 243 Ore. 419, 414 P.2d
328 (1966); Scipior v. Shea, 252 Wis. 185, 31 N.W.2d 199 (1948); Guth v. Fisher,
213 Wis. 323, 251 N.W. 223 (1933); Larson v. Koller, 198 Wis. 16o, 223 N.W.
426 (1929). See also Will v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 191 Wis. 247, 21o N.W.
717 (1926).
2See Will v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 191 Wis. 247, 21o N.W. 717 (1926).
See Augustin v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Transp. Co., 259 Wis. 625, 49 N.W.2d
730 (1951); Scipior v. Shea, 252 Wis. 185, 31 N.W.2d 199 (1948); Biersach v.
Wechselberg, 206 Wis. 113, 238 N.W. 905 (1931); Lefebvre v. Nickolai, 205 Wis.
115, 236 N.W. 684 (1931); Larson v. Koller, 198 Wis. 16o, 223 N.W. 426 (1929).
See also Will v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 191 Wis. 247, 21o N.W. 717 (1926).
4Scipior v. Shea, 252 Wis. 185, 31 N.W.2d 199, 202 (1948) (footnotes added).
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jurors on the issue of contributory negligence will render immaterial
the findings and patterns of jurors' votes on the other two issues.27
Prior to the Ward decision only one case, Bullock v. Yakima Valley
Transportation Co.,28 had held that it was immaterial how the required
fraction of jurors was constituted on each issue to be resolved. The
basis for this decision was apparently -the Bullock court's interpreta-
tion of the word "verdict," which was not consonant with the totality
theory. The applicable Washington statute29 provided that any ten
jurors could agree on a verdict. The case was submitted to the jury
by interrogatories, with instructions that any ten of their number
might agree upon any one of the interrogatories. The same ten jurors
did not agree with each answer returned, but the court held that the
interrogatories were special verdicts, and extended the word "verdict"
as used in the statute to include such special verdicts. It was therefore
impliedly held that the jury returned as many verdicts as it answered
interrogatories. Other jurisdictions have criticized this decision, pri-
marily on the basis of its failure to take cognizance of the verdict as
a totality3 0 and a later Washington case has followed the Wisconsin
rule.31
The Ward decision represents a very substantial shift in judicial
reasoning and invites close scrutiny of its rationale and ramifications.
As one basis for its decision, the New Jersey court argued that the
state constitution and statute refer only to the term "verdict", and the
legislature therefore did not intend to require that each decision
within the verdict be agreed upon by the same ten jurors. It is argued
that "[t]he failure to do so indicates they realized that trials consist of
many issues .... "32 This assumption would seem to suggest that the
legislature of New Jersey rejects the totality theory of the verdict. The
statute provides that "[i]n any civil cause wherein a jury of 12 shall
"Larson v. Koller, 198 Wis. 16o, 223 N.W. 426 (1929); Will v. Chicago, M.
& St. P. Ry., 191 Wis. 247, 21o N.W. 717 (1926). This applies only to those
jurisdictions in which the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is a bar of his
recovery.
lio8 Wash. 413, 184 P. 641 (1919).
'"'In all trials by juries of twelve in the superior court ... when ten or
more jurors agree upon a verdict ... the verdict shall stand as the verdict of
the whole jury." Id. at 648, citing WASH. Ru. CODE § 658.
"Plaster v. Akron Union Pass. Depot Co., ioi Ohio App. 27, 137 N.E.2d
624, 627 (1955); Munger v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 243 Ore. 419, 414 P.2d
328, 331 (1966).
31Devoni v. Department of Labor 9- Indus., 36 Wash. 2d 227, 217 P.2d 332
(195o). The court did not distinguish the Bullock decision and there is no citation
to it in the Devoni opinion.
31258 A.2d at 38o.
19701
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be impaneled, a verdict may be rendered by io or more of the jury
agreeing ... ."33 However, the court simultaneously relied on the in-
terpretation of Andres v. United States34 by assuming the legislature
intended "verdict" to be "a single final decision of a jury on all the
factual issues submitted to it by a court for determination." 35 This in-
terpretation would appear to indicate that the legislature did in fact
intend to follow the totality theory. These two assumptions of legis-
lative intent are decidedly inconsistent. Had the New Jersey court
not introduced the "single final decision" interpretation of Andres,
but instead rested on its initial assumption that by ommission the
legislature intended that any ten jurors be permitted to resolve any
issue, the ultimate result reached in Ward would have been reason-
able and logically consistent. The statute, which is ambiguous on its
face, would fairly support the ultimate decision in Ward. But the in-
troduction of Andres, a criminal case dealing with unanimous ver-
dicts and therefore questionable authority for the Ward problem,
creates a conflicting premise which renders the logical framework
supporting the final decision in Ward of doubtful validity. When the
Andres interpretation of a verdict was imputed to the legislature, the
court seemingly bound itself to adopt the Wisconsin rule. If the law
allows a verdict to be rendered by ten of twelve jurors, and a verdict
is a single final decision, the same jurors concurring on all issues
ought to be necessary to validate the verdict. The only way to resolve
the inconsistency is to assume that, having posited the Andres inter-
pretation, the court ignored it and proceeded on the assumption that
the legislature intended by omission to suggest the verdict to be
something other than a single final decision.
The Ward court reasoned that the alternative to its rule would be
to disqualify from voting on damages the two jurors dissenting from
liability. Since there was no evidence that the jurors in question were
prejudiced in their votes on damages by their finding of no liability,
disqualification would be improper. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the court assumed that the jurors had respected their oath
'N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:8o-2 (1952).
'333 U.S. 740 (1948).
' 258 A.2d at 38o. Andres v. United States, 33 U.S. 740 (1948), was cited as
authority for this proposition. Andres involved a first degree murder conviction
in which the jury was unable to agree unanimously as to the addition to the
verdict of the words "without capital punishment." In the absence of such
qualification, the death sentence is mandatory. The Court ruled that unanimity,
either for or against the addition of the phrase, was necessary, and that the
verdict was incomplete and invalid without a unanimous finding on both guilt
and punishment. The case was remanded for a new trial.
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to render a true verdict according to the evidence. The Wisconsin rule
assumes the possibility that a juror who is convinced that the defend-
ant was not negligent will not and perhaps cannot completely ignore
his convictions and honestly assess the damages to be awarded to the
plaintiff. By accepting this possibility, the Wisconsin rule presupposes
that votes cast for damages but against liability may represent less
than a fair evaluation of the evidence. Because the Wisconsin rule
views the verdict as a totality, the question is not simply whether the
defendant is liable, but rather to what extent he is liable. Under this
reasoning, liability by itself is empty and becomes meaningful only
when coupled with a determination of the monetary extent of the
liability. The Ward rule posits a rebuttable presumption that the
jurors acted fairly, whereas the Wisconsin rule asserts the possibility
of unfairness in each case.
Ward assumes that the Wisconsin rule would disqualify those jurors
dissenting on liability from participating in the determination of dam-
ages. However, the cases following the Wisconsin rule have consistently
allowed dissenters to participate in the deliberation of other essential
issues.36 It is reasoned that if these jurors were not allowed to partici-
pate, the litigants would be denied their right to a jury trial.37 As the
nonunanimous vedict statutes refer to the common law jury of
twelve,38 they do not permit deliberation by ten or eleven. The five-
sixths non-unanimous provision means five-sixths of the jury of
twelve, but the provision does not excuse the necessity of deliberation
by twelve jurorss 9 "Even though [a fraction of the jury] can decide
a civil case, parties are entitled to have that decision, whether for
them or against them, based on the honest deliberations of twelve
qualified men." 40
The Wisconsin rule allows the dissenters to continue participating
in the deliberations. However, it must be recognized that these jurors
are effectively disenfranchised on all other issues, as their votes are
not allowed to be a prerequisite to satisfying the fractional minimum. 41
-Carlin v. Prickett, 81 Cal. App. 2d 688, 184 P.2d 945 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947);
Fraundorf v. Schmidt, 216 Wis. x58, 256 N.W. 699 (1934); Guth v. Fisher, 213
Wis. 323, 251 N.W. 223 (1933); see Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Ore. 521, 414 P.2d
797 (1966).
7See cases cited note 38 infra.
3See Minnequa Cooperage Co. v. Hendricks, 13o Ark. 264, 197 S.W. 280
(1917); cf. Johnson v. Holzemer, 263 Minn. 227, 116 N.W.2d 673 (1962).
'*Johnson v. Holzemer, 263 Minn. 227, 116 N.V.2d 673 (1962); Lee v. Baltimore
Hotel Co., 345 Mo. 458, 136 S.W.2d 695 (1939); Measeck v. Noble, 9 App. Div.
2d 19, 189 N.Y.S.2d 7.48 (1959)-
",Lee v. Baltimore Hotel Co., 345 Mo. 458, 136 S.W.2d 695, U98 (1939).
"See cases cited note 14 supra.
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They are powerless to cast an effective vote, and they cannot themselves
hang the jury. Their only alternative is to practice verbal persuasion
on -their fellow jurors. They may try to convince other jurors that
the damages proposed are too high, and perhaps succeed in getting
the same ten to make a smaller award. If they convince only one or
two others, they may at least succeed in hanging the jury. Under the
Wisconsin rule, it is not mandatory that juries reach verdicts that
will validly support judgment. They are permitted to disagree by in-
dividually making inconsistent findings, and thereby return a verdict
that will not support judgment.4 2 The Wisconsin rule therefore as-
sumes that to disqualify the dissenters would be to deny this right to
disagree. However, if the theory behind the rule is to prevent the
activity of dissenters, this rule would seem to be less than totally
effective. It removes the ability of the dissenter to return a verdict,
but leaves him with the possibility of influencing other jurors in the
verdict returned.
Rather than disenfranchise any member of the jury, the New
Jersey court elected to allow full participation by all jurors. The
difference appears to lie in the interpretation of the juror's proper
role in jury deliberations. The court might have believed that the
two jurors dissenting from liability were willing to accept the reason-
ing of the other ten when it became clear that they were heavily out-
voted. If this were the case and the dissenters were honestly willing
to accept the liabiltiy of the defendant, they would need only to
change their vote on liability and then their vote as to damages would
be effective under the Wisconsin rule for a valid verdict. It can be
argued that by failing to change their vote, the dissenters do not
fully accept the finding of the other ten, and that even while voting
on damages they believe the defendant is not liable. Following this
reasoning, the verdict "is reached only by the surrender of conscienti-
ous convictions upon one material issue by some jurors .... ,43
But perhaps the dissenters proceeded in the deliberations without
making this surrender. It might be argued that after ten jurors deter-
mine liability, the other two can accept that determination as a
hypothesis and proceed to determine the extent to which the plain-
tiff has been damaged. In this situation, the dissenter could still main-
tain his belief that the defendant was not negligent, relying on the
"Fraundorf v. Schmidt, 216 Wis. 158, 256 N.W. 699 (1934); Guth v. Fisher,
213 Wis. g23, 251 N.AV. 223 (1933).
'"James Turner & Sons v. Great N. Ry., 67 N.D. 347, 272 N.W. 489, 502 (1937).
At common law, if such a surrender was made in return for a similar surrender
by other jurors on another issue, the verdict was invalid as a compromise. Id.
[Vol. XXVII
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determination of the other ten only as a vehicle by which to reach the
question of damages. Accepting liability as a hypothesis also negates
any question of whether the dissenter was prejudiced in his delibera-
tion of damages.
There exists the further possibility that a juror could believe that
the plaintiff had been damaged to a definable extent without believ-
ing the defendant to be liable for that damage. As the evidence deter-
mining liability might well be totally different from that defining the
extent of the plaintiff's injury, the juror could proceed to make inde-
pendent determinations on the two issues. In this situation, the con-
cept of juror consistency would appear to be irrelevant, as the finding
on one issue would not, and perhaps should not, relate to the other
in any way.
The Ward rule would readily encompass both of these possibilities,
but they are not countenanced by the Wisconsin rule. The Wisconsin
rule could only urge that, as to the first, the verdict cannot be based
on hypothetical assumptions, for it must determine the issues and it
therefore resolves, not hypothesizes, that the defendant is liable. As
to the second possibility, the Wisconsin rule might only rely on its
concept of verdict totality, and argue that in the total scheme of the
verdict all essential issues are necessarily related.
A problem arises under the Wisconsin rule in the ability of the
courts to enforce their requirements. If a special verdict, or a general
verdict with interrogatories, is returned by the jury, the determina-
tion of juror consistency as defined by the rule is relatively easy.
These variants of the verdict are in fact primarily directed at illumi-
nating the mental processes followed by the jury in making its deter-
minations.44 The general verdict, however, does not reflect these
mental processes but is "a compound made by the jury which is in-
capable of being broken into its constituent parts."45 If an incon-
sistency occurs in the voting, it might well be immue from detection
since the "constituents of the compound cannot be ascertained."46
Therefore, to poll the jury on a general verdict as to separate issues
would destroy the character of the verdict itself. In a case where a
special verdict was prohibited, such a poll would seem to be error.47
"F. JAMES, JR., CvmL PROCEDURE 296-97 (1965); Sunderland, Verdicts, General
and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920); See L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, 353, 354
(1930).
Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 258 (1920).
0Id.
'To question the jury as to their findings on specific issues embodied in the
general verdict would seem to render that general verdict a special verdict. If
the special verdict is prohibited, such action would appear to be erroneous.
See Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 261 (192o).
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It would appear that the only possible means by which Wisconsin
rule jurisdictions could ascertain inconsistencies, while protecting the
indivisible nature of the general verdict, would be to instruct the
jury as to the totality of the verdict. If a poll were necessary, the judge
might then instruct the jury that, because of the totality doctrine, dis-
agreement with any issue of the verdict constitutes disagreement with
the whole. More than two negative responses from the jury on the poll
would then require a mistrial, as it would inevitably indicate an in-
consistency as defined by the rule. No inquiry would be needed to
ascertain the source of the inconsistency; it would be sufficient merely
to determine its existence.
Although Ward is not specific as to much of the policy determin-
ing its result, it may have reasoned that the change from the common
law requirement of unanimity impliedly recognizes that juries do not
engage in finding "truth", but rather formulate opinions represent-
ing factual probabilities which the legislature felt sufficient to sustain
a verdict. Therefore, five-sixths of the jury would be a sufficient indica-
tion of probability on any issue, and would satisfy the legislative pur-
pose. It can be argued that, in dispensing with the common law un-
animity requirement, the legislature meant to excuse all unanimity,
and therefore unanimity of the fractional minimum should not be
required.
Ward seems to be based essentially on the policy reasons which are
used to justify non-unanimous verdicts. 48 The first of these is "to avert
unjust verdicts resulting from one or two recalcitrant or dishonest
jurors holding out. ... -49 The Ward rule seems to dismiss the possi-
bility of such jurors as at most inconsequential, 50 assuming rather
that the jurors are basically fair, or perhaps that fairness, in the sense
of consistency, is not a relevant concept. The Wisconsin rule, on the
other hand, considers that dishonest and recalcitrant jurors might, on
the damages issue, vote unfairly as to how much the defendant whom
they find faultless will be required to pay.
The court also recognizes the policy considerations of preventing
economic loss to the public, the parties, the attorneys, and the wit-
nesses. The Ward rule would clearly reduce the incidence of mistrials
to a significantly greater extent than would the Wisconsin rule, which
"Note 7 supra.
11258 A.2d at 38i.
1AId. The court reasons that there is no basis for assuming a juror would
violate his oath to render a true verdict according to the evidence presented to
him. It argues, rather, that a juror who is outvoted on one issue will probably
go along with the finding of the other ten or eleven jurors.
CASE COMMENTS
would necessitate a trial in this very action. If the dominant policy to
be served is a reduction of mistrials, surely the Ward rule is the more
functional, as it would also alleviate court congestion and unfairness
from undue delay. The Wisconsin rule puts dominant emphasis on
consistency in jury findings, under the assumption that this concept is
relevant to the verdict and the determination made by jurors. The
two rules are designed to serve essentially different policies.
The foundation of the Wisconsin rule is its particular concept of
verdict totality. Where this view of totality is not recognized, con-
sistency of jury findings has no relevance. However, as the verdict is
the final resolution of the conflict, it must encompass all the issues,
and represent findings on each. Perhaps these issues can be segregated
for individual determination, but no issue exists in a vacuum, and the
determination of each is meaningful to the conflict and its resolution
only as it relates to the others. The Wisconsin rule does not insure
consistency in every case (in some instances an inconsistency might pass
undetected), but it does affirm the principle of consistency as a viable
concept. Although jurors may hypothesize in their deliberations, a
litigant should be entitled to a verdict based on the jurors' convic-
tions.
Ward places the individual juror in the curious position of sus-
taining damages against a defendant he does not recognize as a wrong-
doer. Despite the fact that the Wisconsin rule suffers from problems
of enforcement, by retaining the necessity of unanimity within the
fractional group of jurors required for a valid non-unanimous verdict,
it perceives the verdict to be a final and complete resolution of the
conflict, and insures that resolution will be consistent and essentially
fair.
H. WVILLIAM WALKER, JR.
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